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A STRATEGY FOR RURAL FINANCIAL MARKET REFORM: 
APPLYING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS APPROACH IN GHANA 
by 
Harlan M. Smith II 
& 
Abor Yeboah 
 
ABSTRACT 
We construct, using methods advocated in one strand of the Financial Systems 
Approach literature, a reform-and-renewal program for one of Ghana’s struggling Rural 
Banks--the Kaaseman Rural Bank.  Questionnaire results, local informal financial 
practices, recent institutional innovations in Ghanaian finance, the experiences of 
successful “Nontraditional” rural finance institutions in developing countries, and the 
operating structure of the Rural Bank program indicate that this bank can implement a 
group-lending scheme that will reduce significantly its transaction costs and those of its 
customers.  We thus demonstrate how the Financial Systems Approach can be 
employed to promote sustainable rural financial intermediation in a specific 
socioeconomic and institutional setting.  The potential for our reform proposals to 
succeed in the local Ghanaian context is analyzed carefully. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Throughout most of the post-World War II period, governments across the 
developing world have intervened in rural financial markets (RFMs) in order to promote 
income expansion and alleviate rural poverty.  In many of these efforts, especially 
during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the authorities pursued the “Directed Credit 
Approach.”  Smallholders were viewed as unable to better themselves (e.g., increase 
production and productivity, and adopt new technologies) without external assistance in 
the form of credit, since they were too poor to save.  But private banks could not (or 
would not) lend on appropriate terms to this sector, and thus farmers were forced into 
the hands of moneylenders.  The solution: establish government-owned specialized 
institutions to provide subsidized credit to the target population. 
 The uniformly disappointing results of these so-called “traditional rural credit 
projects” were first exposed in critiques of the Directed Credit Approach associated with 
the Ohio State School of rural credit in the late 1970s and early 1980s.1  The so-called 
“New View” of rural credit that developed out of this literature advocated more careful 
study of RFMs in terms of the demand for financial services, institutional design, 
informal financial sector practices, and the role of government policy.  In the process, 
the goals of RFM reform came to be understood as 1) to enhance the efficiency of 
financial intermediation, and 2) to expand access to financial services--on a sustainable 
basis--for small farmers, small-scale enterprises, and the rural poor. 
 By the early 1990s, two general approaches to financial market reform had taken 
shape.  The first, known as “Financial Liberalization”, was based upon the theory of 
“Financial Repression”.  The second has been labeled the “Financial Systems 
Approach” or, alternatively, the “Financial Systems Development Approach”.  Restrictive 
government policies, theorists in the former tradition argue, are the principal cause of 
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the shallow, fragmented, and inefficient financial systems plaguing many developing 
countries (McKinnon 1973).  To enhance the efficiency of the financial system and to 
create more access to financial services for marginalized groups, the prescription is 
straightforward: liberalize the financial system by eliminating restrictions on interest 
rates, mandatory sectoral credit allocations, and credit ceilings.2   
Students of RFMs working in the tradition of the latter approach focus on the key 
structural features of the economic environment within which Rural Finance Institutions 
(RFIs) operate.  These features--incomplete information, missing markets, and 
imperfect contract enforcement--influence the nature of savings and credit transactions 
in important ways.  The ability of an RFI to cope with these features thus determines its 
ability to provide desired financial services to the target population on a widespread and 
sustained basis.  Outreach and financial self-sustainability, therefore, are the criteria to 
be used when evaluating RFI performance (Yaron 1994).  If an RFI does achieve 
significant outreach on a sustainable basis, analysts in this tradition argue that it is likely 
to have the desired impact on rural income and poverty.3 
 Adherents to the Financial Systems Approach have grouped themselves into two 
separate schools of thought.  The first, which we call the “Linkage” school, argues that 
each financial-system segment (formal, informal, semi-formal) has specific comparative 
advantages in providing financial services.  Reform efforts should focus on exploiting 
these advantages by creating savings and credit linkages among existing formal, semi-
formal, and informal financial institutions.  Each segment, then, should be encouraged 
to operate freely within its specialized market niche.4 
 The second strand of Financial Systems Approach thought can be termed the 
“Learn From Success” school.  Advocates of this view argue that locally-successful 
informal financial sector practices should inform the design and policies of formal RFIs. 
In addition, the experiences of so-called “Nontraditional” RFIs, which combine features 
of formal and informal finance to serve small savers and borrowers effectively in many 
developing countries, should be drawn upon when designing RFM reforms.  By 
adopting and adapting key features of local informal financial practice and successful 
Nontraditional RFIs, therefore, the outreach and self-sustainability of formal-sector RFIs 
can be enhanced.5 
 The purpose of this paper is to show how the Learn From Success school of 
thought can be operationalized in a particular institutional and economic setting.  
Specifically, we combine widespread informal financial practices in Ghana with some 
key features of successful Nontraditional RFIs in the developing world to develop a 
package of policy reforms that has the potential to re-invent one of Ghana’s struggling 
Rural Banks as the institution it was originally intended to be.  Our efforts thus 
constitute a substantive contribution to the Financial Systems Approach literature, for in 
only a few cases has the knowledge obtained from studying informal financial practices 
in the developing world and the features of successful RFIs actually been used to 
redesign the operating procedures of an existing, struggling, formal RFI.6   Furthermore, 
the approach we take in developing our reform proposals, essentially that of 
“demonstrating the possibilities of an appropriate environment” (Braverman & Guasch 
1986: 1253), suggests a concrete method of formal-sector RFI reform that may be more 
feasible in many contexts than attempting to re-engineer an entire rural credit program 
from the top down. 
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 Ghana’s Rural Bank scheme was initiated in 1976, under the auspices of the 
Bank of Ghana (the country’s central bank).  The purpose of this program was to serve 
small borrowers and savers in rural areas, who at the time had essentially no access to 
institutional savings and credit facilities.  RFM specialists would recognize in this 
program many elements of the Directed Credit Approach.  For its time, however, the 
Rural Bank project was relatively well thought out.  Many features of this program, 
indeed, foreshadowed the yet-to-be developed Financial Systems Approach to RFM 
intervention. 
 During its first decade of operations, the Rural Bank program proved, in general, 
to be a success.  By the late 1980s, however, many individual Rural Banks were 
floundering.  The government attempted to reinvigorate the program via a 
macroeconomic Financial Liberalization effort initiated in 1988 and a comprehensive 
Rural Bank restructuring exercise begun in 1991.  Despite these efforts, in the mid-
1990s the 125 Rural Banks in operation were, in general, not fulfilling their promise--
and struggling financially (Yeboah 1994), (Essel 1996), and (Aryeetey 1996). 
We focus our reform proposals in this paper not on the entire Rural Bank program, but 
rather on one particular Rural Bank--the Kaaseman Rural Bank.  This institution was 
established in 1987, in the heart of a cocoa area in the Western Region, to serve the 
local cocoa-farming clientele.  Our work, therefore, can be considered an example of 
localized research, conducted within a specific socioeconomic and institutional context, 
of the sort advocated by Aryeetey & Udry (1994).  We take as given these authors’ 
observation that “credit transactions reflect the [specific] economic environment within 
which they occur”, and design our reform-and-renewal program accordingly. 
We make no claim, therefore, that the specific reforms we advocate for the Kaaseman 
Rural Bank are generalizable to the Rural Bank scheme as a whole.  We thus agree 
with another adherent to the Financial Systems Approach (Yaron 1994), who reminds 
students of RFM reform that socioeconomic environments, hence social value systems, 
are localized and specific.  Reforms that prove successful in one setting, therefore, may 
not work at all in another. 
 The organization of this paper is as follows.  In Section 2 we sketch out the 
history of institutional rural credit in Ghana.  In the process, we focus explicitly on the 
operations of the Rural Bank program from its inception in 1976 to the mid-1990s.  In 
Section 3 we use secondary and primary data sources to analyze the performance of 
the Kaaseman Rural Bank in terms of its structure, activities, problems, and future 
prospects.  We construct a specific reform-and-renewal program for this institution in 
Section 4, and highlight the benefits of our proposals for both the bank and its 
customers.  We conclude in Section 5 by analyzing the potential for our proposed 
reforms to succeed in the local Ghanaian context, in light of the current structure of the 
Rural Bank program, recent institutional innovations in Ghanaian finance, and the 
central lessons drawn from both successful and unsuccessful financial practices in 
Ghana, Africa, and the developing world. 
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II.     INSTITUTIONAL RURAL CREDIT IN GHANA, AND THE RURAL BANK 
PROGRAM 
 
 From the 1950s to the 1980s, Ghana employed the Directed Credit approach to 
intervention in rural credit markets, or what Essel (1996) terms the “Increased 
Agricultural Production Approach.”  Analysts operating in this tradition view the typical 
Ghanaian smallholder as being able to invest only a small percentage of his/her 
already-low income.  Agricultural output and income, therefore, remain low over time, 
because farmers are trapped in what Owusu-Acheampong (1986) called the “Little 
Opportunities Circle”:  little capital outlay begets little marketable surplus, little income, 
and once again little capital outlay.  The goal of the Increased Agricultural Production 
Approach is to break this circle by injecting credit into the farm sector at a point 
between little income and little capital outlay.  The result would be a rise in smallholder 
disposable income.  Savings and investment would increase accordingly, output would 
expand, farm incomes would rise, and rural poverty would be alleviated. 
The Bank of Ghana made several attempts in the 1960s and 1970s to implement this 
approach.  For example, it established a Rural Credit Department, charged with 
mobilizing investment funds for agriculture, in the early 1960s.  In 1969 the central bank 
sponsored a Small Borrower Credit Guarantee scheme through the commercial banks 
and Development Finance Institutions, in hopes of bringing smallholders within reach of 
the formal financial sector.  The independent Ghana Credit Union, which had been 
funding investments in rural income-generating activities since 1955, received 
significant Bank of Ghana financial support in 1974. 
 During this period the central government implemented additional measures to 
promote rural development via the Directed Credit Approach.  For example, in 1965 the 
first Development Finance Institution dedicated to agriculture--the Agricultural 
Development Bank--was established.  This bank--a typical “supply-led” financial 
institution in the tradition of Directed Credit programs around the developing world 
(Yaron 1994)--was given a mandate to funnel “outside money” (in the form of external 
grants and loans, and central government funds) to the small-scale rural sector on 
concessional terms. 
 These interventions did little to alleviate the problem.  By the end of the 1960s, 
institutional rural credit for smallholders was “nonexistent” according to Okyere (1990), 
and “virtually absent” according to Essel (1996).  Despite all government efforts, 
including the imposition of sectoral credit-allocation requirements on commercial banks, 
by the early 1970s only nine percent of all commercial bank and Development Finance 
Institution credit was going to agriculture.  Most of this, moreover, was absorbed by the 
large-scale, relatively rich farmers. 
 The formal financial sector, in sum, viewed lending to agriculture as unprofitable.  
The administrative costs associated with screening, monitoring, and enforcing 
repayment on small loans dispersed over wide geographic areas were high, along with 
the perceived default risk.  Formal institutions reacted to these costs and risks by 
imposing burdensome requirements upon would-be borrowers. To qualify for a loan, 
first of all, a farmer had to be literate: an active current (demand deposit) account at the 
bank and the ability to provide full business records were standard application 
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requirements.  In addition, would-be borrowers were forced to absorb significant 
nonfinancial transaction costs such as the time involved in traveling to and from the 
institution’s premises, and the time spent at the institution itself, during the loan-
application process.  Finally, a farmer was required to put up the title to his/her land as 
collateral.  But most rural dwellers did not (and today still do not) own the land they 
farm.  Institutional credit, therefore, was beyond the reach of Ghana’s smallholders. 
In light of this situation, in 1970 the Bank of Ghana undertook a comprehensive study of 
the rural credit situation, which resulted in the decision to establish the Rural Bank 
program in 1976.  Each Rural Bank is a unit bank, owned and managed by the local 
community, with a statutory operating radius of 38 km.  The central bank must approve 
the establishment of an individual Rural Bank, helps to finance it by purchasing shares 
equal to one-third of the initial share capital, and supervises its operations via the Rural 
Bank Department.  The purposes of the Rural Bank program, according to the 
Association of Rural Banks (Essel 1996), are 
 
1. To stimulate banking habits among rural dwellers; 
2. To mobilize resources locked up in rural areas, for development; 
3. To encourage saving among rural dwellers—by providing safe and accessible 
deposit facilities; 
4. To provide credit facilities to small-scale farmers and cottage industrialists 
operating within the local area. 
 
Rural Banks, therefore, are designed to serve small borrowers and savers.  As 
the Governor of the Bank of Ghana put it in 1987, the Rural Bank program would 
remove some of the impediments facing farmers in formal credit markets by offering 
them banking services “at their doorsteps.”  The Ghanaian press, likewise, was 
enthusiastic about the program: the scheme was going to be a “God-sent relief [to rural 
dwellers] from the bureaucracy and out-of-reach demands of the commercial banks,” 
and thus a “golden opportunity” for the Ghanaian farmer to “demonstrate his business 
acumen” (The Mirror: May 9, 1991; Daily Graphic: May 9, 1987). 
The Rural Bank program, clearly, contains many elements of the Directed Credit 
Approach.  Each bank is a formal financial institution, and is subject to all national 
commercial bank legislation and requirements.  Furthermore, each Rural Bank must 
adhere to specific sectoral credit-allocation requirements: a minimum of 50 percent of 
its loan portfolio must be in agriculture, a maximum of 20 percent can be in trade and 
transport, and 30 percent should go to cottage industries. 
The Rural Bank scheme, however, is not a classic “traditional rural credit 
project.”  Rural Banks, in other words, are not mere disbursement windows for 
externally-provided funds (i.e., exogenous shocks designed to break the Little 
Opportunities Circle).  Instead, this scheme can be interpreted as an early attempt to 
employ the Financial Systems Approach to RFM reform and development.  The focus 
of the Rural Bank program is on the creation of institutions (not “project centers”) that 
hopefully will become permanent features of the local economic environment.  Each 
bank’s lending resources, for example, are to be generated internally--via explicit efforts 
to mobilize voluntary savings.  Furthermore, each bank’s local management has the 
authority to formulate its own operational policies, pursue branch-office expansion, and 
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determine loan terms (i.e., sizes, maturities, interest charges)--and thereby tailor its 
services to local needs.  In this vein, Rural Banks are encouraged to engage in group-
based lending activities; explicit guidelines governing such activity, similar to those in 
more well-known group lending schemes such as the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, 
are incorporated into the program. 
In sum, the overarching purpose of the scheme is to bring desired financial 
services to local rural communities on a sustainable basis--and hence to enhance the 
quantity and quality of rural financial intermediation.  In this respect the Rural Bank 
program was ahead of its time, for it included many of the elements of RFI success 
identified in the Financial Systems Approach literature of the 1980s and 1990s.  On the 
surface, at least, the program appeared built for success. 
The first Rural Bank opened for business in 1976, and over the next eleven 
years (1976-87) the program spread to all 10 regions of the country.  By 1987 fourteen  
percent of the rural population, or 553,000 people, held accounts at 117 Rural Banks 
across Ghana.  Deposits totaled 2.2 billion cedis; deposits per person had climbed 
2,913 percent over this period, to reach 3,978 cedis ($US25.87 at the prevailing 
exchange rate) in 1987.  The program’s loan portfolio was valued at 634 million cedis, 
or $US4.12 million. 
Observers concluded that the program had been “quite successful” in mobilizing 
savings (Nissanke 1991), and that its provision of safe and secure deposit facilities for 
rural dwellers was a “major achievement” (Okyere 1990).  Moreover, the Rural Bank 
scheme had contributed to the expansion of agricultural output, because its impact on 
farm profitability “could not be overemphasized” (Okyere 1990). 
The dramatic growth of the scheme during the 1980s, in terms of outreach, can 
be traced to the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) initiated by the government in 
1983.7   The Rural Bank program was seized upon as the principal vehicle through 
which two of the ERP’s medium-run goals for agriculture would be pursued: 
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1. Increases in “the level and efficiency of rural financial intermediation, in 
order to increase the role of the private sector in agricultural growth, 
especially small farmers and small rural entrepreneurs” (Okyere 1990:  
75); 
2. Improvements in the method of producer payment, particularly in the cocoa 
sector (Ghana’s principal cash crop). 
 
The first of these goals was fully consistent with the original purpose and aims of 
the Rural Bank scheme.  The second led to the government’s decision to have the 
Rural Banks manage a new cocoa-farmer payment scheme. 
When selling cocoa to the Produce Buying Division of the Ghana Cocoa 
Marketing Board (GCMB-PBD), farmers were now to be paid with a special check--an 
“Akuafo Check.”  At the farmer’s request, the PBD would specify the “beneficiary” of the 
check--the bank at which the farmer plans to cash the check.  The central government 
would then distribute funds for check-redemption to the Rural Banks in each cocoa 
area, based upon estimates of the area’s total PBD purchases.  The banks would 
purchase the checks from the farmers (and get reimbursed if the necessary money had 
not yet arrived), and receive commissions in the process. 
The Akuafo Check system represented a marked improvement over previous 
payment methods.8   But in most of the more remote cocoa areas, no formal financial 
institutions existed where farmers could cash their Akuafo Checks.  Many farmers were 
thus forced to bear significant expenses (in terms of travel-time, transport fares, and 
security) in order to receive payment.  The solution to this problem was to establish 
more Rural Banks in the cocoa areas. 
The expansion of the Rural Bank network in the 1980s was thus designed, in 
part, to facilitate the new cocoa payment method.  Furthermore, the banks’ 
management of the Akuafo Check scheme had the potential to enhance their efforts to 
develop sustainable credit linkages with local cocoa-farming populations; a significant 
percentage of each Akuafo Check, hopefully, would be transformed into voluntary 
savings at the banks. 
The initial results of the Akuafo Check-Rural Bank connection were encouraging.  
Okyere (1990: 76) noted that “prompt payment of cocoa farmers through the Rural 
Bank system” was leading to more patronage of the banks as financial institutions, and 
increased deposit-mobilization.  By the end of the 1980s, according to Okyere (1990), 
the cocoa sector had become a “major beneficiary” of the Rural Bank scheme. 
A significant loan-recovery problem, however, began to appear in the latter half 
of the 1980s.  Default rates across most of the Rural Banks had become high, and were 
rising.  Some borrowers were unable to repay, due to exogenous factors such as 
weather and/or market conditions.  Other recipients had misapplied their credit, 
diverting it towards non-productive uses such as land litigation and funeral ceremonies 
(Essel 1996), and hence were also unable to service their debt.  Still others were 
unwilling to repay.  Since the Rural Banks were marketed as “for the communities,” 
some borrowers “saw nothing wrong in owing their communities (the banks) indefinitely, 
when the means to repay was not there” (Essel 1996: 46).  Finally, Rural Bank credit 
was often perceived as outside money--grant money provided by the central 
government out of general tax revenues--that did not need to be repaid. 
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As a result, the Rural Banks became increasingly reluctant to lend to their target 
populations (i.e., farmers and fishermen).  Instead, the banks diverted their credit to 
salaried workers (perceived as less risky due to a regular income stream), and to 
essentially risk-free government securities.  By 1991 Rural Bank holdings of such 
securities comprised 30 percent of all interest-earning assets in the system (Essel 
1996).  The banks thus increasingly violated the scheme’s statutory credit-allocation 
mandate: from 1977 to 1988 the proportion of total credit extended to agriculture fell in 
half; by 1988 credit to agriculture comprised only 34 percent of the Rural Banks’ 
combined loan portfolio (Nissanke 1991). 
The banks’ target groups, not surprisingly, began to lose confidence in the 
scheme.  For example, cocoa farmers began to divert their Akuafo Checks away from 
the Rural Banks and to the few big urban-based commercial banks that dominate 
Ghana’s formal financial sector, despite the expenses that had to be absorbed.  This 
exacerbated the default problem of the cocoa-area Rural Banks, and hampered their 
savings-mobilization efforts.  The public in general, moreover, had “begun to lose 
confidence” in the some of the Rural Banks by the late 1980s, according to the 
Governor of the Bank of Ghana.  A generalized solvency/liquidity crisis was looming; 
the President of the Association of Rural Banks reported in a 1989 speech that fully 70 
percent of all banks were functioning “below the poverty line.” 
The central government responded to this crisis by implementing a Rural 
Finance Project in 1990, funded by the International Development Association.  This 
project was one component of the government’s Financial Sector Adjustment Program, 
initiated in 1988 under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank, the goals of which 
were financial liberalization and a restructuring of the formal financial system. 
The initial phase of the Rural Finance Project, a comprehensive diagnostic study 
of each individual Rural Bank during 1991, confirmed the problems.  Only two of the 
123 banks were in full compliance with the Amended National Banking Law of 1989 
(PNDC Law 225), and hence met all statutory capital adequacy, liquidity, and 
manpower requirements.  These two banks, therefore, were the only two to receive the 
central bank’s “Satisfactory” rating at that time.  The other 121 banks, rated “Mediocre” 
by the Bank of Ghana, were suffering from capital inadequacy and/or illiquidity, 
accumulating losses, and having difficulty meeting the withdrawal demands of 
depositors. 
As the reform effort proceeded during 1991-94, some progress was made.  For 
example, by the end of 1994 nearly half (44 percent) of the 125 Rural Banks in 
operation at that time were rated Satisfactory.  Deposits in the scheme rose 192 
percent during these years, and deposits per person stood at 22,500 cedis as of 1994--
a 465.5 percent increase over the 1987 level.9 
But problems persisted.  Over half (56 percent) of the Rural Banks were still not 
in compliance with PNDC Law 225 by the end of 1994.  Nineteen of these, moreover, 
had become officially categorized as “Distressed”--they were insolvent, accumulating 
heavy losses, unable (in the judgement of the central bank) to be repaired by capital 
injections or restructuring, and essentially collapsed.  Furthermore, credit diversion by 
the banks continued unabated.  By 1994 41.4 percent of all interest-earning assets held 
by the Rural Banks consisted of government securities.  Total loans and advances had 
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fallen to only 48.5 percent of deposits, more evidence of the banks’ continued 
reluctance to lend to their target populations. 
Customer-Rural Bank relations as of 1994, therefore, were characterized by 
generalized “mistrust” (Essel 1996).  The sporadic but spectacular cases of 
misappropriation and embezzlement of funds by bank officials that received national 
attention in the press during the early 1990s added fuel to the fire, so to speak.  The 
cocoa farmers, as a result, continued to disengage from the scheme by diverting their 
Akuafo Checks away from the Rural Banks.  During the 1991/2 cocoa season, for 
example, the 89 Rural Banks in cocoa areas purchased only 33 percent of the value of 
all Akuafo Checks issued in the country. 
The central bank responded by implementing a restructuring program in 1994.  
This was an attempt “to arrest the situation before people totally lose confidence in the 
Rural Banks” (Essel 1996: 70).  For example, by 1995 the Bank of Ghana had scaled 
back significantly the lending operations of the Mediocre banks, and suspended entirely 
all lending by Distressed banks.  To protect depositors in the short term, most of these 
institutions’ mobilized resources were channeled into safe government securities.  
Distressed Rural Banks, moreover, had to accept mandatory staffing reductions to cut 
administrative expenses.   
As of 1996 the government sought to deepen this reform effort by implementing 
yet more restructuring measures:  the central bank focused on making sure that 
Satisfactory Rural Banks remained in strict compliance with all commercial banking 
laws and regulations; with respect to the Mediocre and Distressed banks, the 
government continued to emphasize retrenchment and curtailment of operations.  In 
terms of the Rural Bank scheme as a whole, the Bank of Ghana did not pursue a re-
engineering strategy, nor did it seek to re-invent the program as the one it was originally 
intended to be.  The government’s response to the Rural Bank crisis during 1994-96, 
therefore, was similar to governmental responses to formal financial sector problems 
throughout Africa during these years:  on a bank-by-bank basis the government focused 
on repairing the damage to, and strengthening, the formal financial system; at the 
macroeconomic level financial liberalization was pursued (African Development Bank 
1994), (Aryeetey et al 1997). 
 
III.  CASE STUDY: THE KAASEMAN RURAL BANK 
 
Structure and Operations 
The Kaaseman Rural Bank (KRB) commenced operations on November 3, 
1987.  Located in Ghana’s Western Region, just south of the regional border with 
Brong-Ahafo and along the international border with the Cote d’Ivoire, the KRB was 
originally established to serve cocoa farmers in the Kaase Cocoa District (KCD).  As of 
mid-1994 the bank was operating eight branch offices: three within the KCD, four 
outside the KCD and within the Western Region, and one in Brong-Ahafo.  The KRB’s 
current operating radius exceeds 100 km. 
The bank’s clientele consists of traders, civil servants (e.g., teachers, GCMB 
personnel, agricultural extension officers, policemen, and customs officials) and, most 
importantly, cocoa farmers.  As of 1994 there were 9,710 cocoa farmers within the 
KCD, and another 11,700 farmed outside the KCD but within the bank’s extended 
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service area.  Depending on the branch, these farmers comprise between 50 percent 
and 95 percent of the KRB’s customers; 75 percent of the bank’s total clientele is 
engaged in cocoa farming. 
To study the operations of the KRB, we used both published data and survey 
data collected through formal and informal interviewing activities.  The published 
sources we consulted included copies of the bank’s Annual Reports for the years 
1990/91-1993/94, additional records kept by the KRB up through August 1994, and 
official PBD cocoa purchasing and producer price records for the KCD during the period 
1990/91-1993/94.  We supplemented this information by administering a questionnaire 
to each of the KRB’s branch heads, the bank’s Head Accountant, and one other 
headquarters staff member.  In this questionnaire we asked about the KRB's relations 
with its local farmer-borrowers, the sizes and types of loans granted, collateral 
requirements, the bank's perspective on the key sources of difficulty in the loan-granting 
and recovery processes, and the bank's plans for improving performance.  We also 
sought to learn how the Akuafo Check system operates, what the bank officials 
perceive to be its central problems, and their thoughts on its future.  To flesh out this 
information, we interviewed several local GCMB-PBD agents and officials of the Kakum 
Rural Bank (see the Essel & Newsome article in this issue) on an informal basis. 
Finally, during late 1993 and early 1994 we administered a questionnaire to a 
sample of 40 cocoa farmers--five chosen at random from each of the eight areas in 
which the KRB operates.  During these interviews we focused on each farmer's 
personal history, farming activities, and relations with the KRB and other financial 
institutions.  We sought information about the services each respondent obtains from 
the KRB, his/her access to credit, any problems they had experienced in their dealings 
with the KRB, and their future banking plans. 
The KRB offers its cocoa-farming customers Akuafo Check cashing services, 
and its entire clientele has access to deposit and loan facilities.  As of March 1994, the 
KRB had mobilized a total of 292.4 million cedis ($US302,000 at the prevailing 
exchange rate) in deposits, held in 18,269 savings and current (demand deposit) 
accounts.  Deposits per person thus equaled 16,006 cedis, or $US16.53.  Savings 
accounts, which have paid nominal interest of between 10 and 15 percent per year so 
far in the 1990s, predominate: 86 percent of all active accounts, as of March 1994, 
were savings accounts.10  Between 90 percent and 95 percent of these, according to 
KRB officials, are operated by cocoa farmers.  Thus between 14,000 and 15,000 cocoa 
farmers--roughly two-thirds of all the farmers in the bank’s extended service area--bank 
at the KRB. 
The KRB’s loan portfolio, as of mid-1994, stood at 333 million cedis 
($US344,000).  The majority (61.5 percent) of these loans were scheduled, whereas 
overdrafts comprised the rest.  All loans had maturities of less than one year, and 
ranged in size (according to KRB officials) from 20,000 cedis (on the order of 20 
dollars) to 8 million cedis (over $US8,200).  Regardless of size, each loan carried an 
annual nominal interest rate of 30 percent during 1992/3 and 1993/4, up from 26 
percent the previous two years.  The real interest rate on KRB loans, as of mid-1994, 
was slightly over 6 percent. 
To obtain a loan a cocoa farmer has to put up the title to his/her farm or dwelling 
house as collateral--or provide a “guarantor” who can put up such collateral.  
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Repayment is secured through deductions from the debtor’s savings account and/or 
from the farmer’s next Akuafo Check cashed at the KRB. 
One of the primary goals of the KRB has been to provide local cocoa farmers 
with a dependable Akuafo Check cashing service.  Prior to the establishment of the 
KRB, there were no institutional banking facilities within the KCD--which meant that the 
cocoa farmers were unable to cash their Akuafo Checks without expensive, arduous, 
and long (50-100 km or more) journeys outside the KCD to large towns in the southwest 
part of Brong-Ahafo or to Essam, situated south of the KCD.  The bank’s branch-office 
expansion efforts, likewise, have been designed inter alia to accommodate the regional 
cocoa farmers’ need for an Akuafo Check cashing service. 
To summarize the current financial position of the KRB, consider how it ranks 
against the average Rural Bank as of 1994.  The KRB is bigger, by far, in terms of 
number of accounts, total deposits, and loan portfolio.  The average Rural Bank has 
only 5,700 account-holders, 128 million cedis in deposits, and outstanding loans 
totaling 62 million cedis.  These figures are 31.2 percent, 43.8 percent, and 18.6 
percent, respectively, of the KRB’s totals.  In terms of deposits per person, however, the 
KRB lags behind; the average Rural Bank held 22,500 cedis ($US23.24) on deposit per 
person as of 1994, a figure 40 percent again as large as that of the KRB.  Overall, the 
KRB was rated Satisfactory by the central bank in 1994, whereas the average Rural 
Bank was ranked in the Mediocre category. 
Turning now to the cocoa farmers in our study area, we note first of all that 
literacy is practically non-existent.  Furthermore, they do not own title to the land they 
farm.11  The typical farmer in our research sample, more specifically, is male, 45 years 
old, illiterate, and does not own title to his farmland.  He has been growing cocoa for 21 
years, and his farm help includes both hired labor and family members. 
All are members of officially-constituted “Societies,” which function as the agents 
for the cocoa farmers in their dealings with the GCMB-PBD.  The 164 Societies 
registered with the local marketing board and the KRB each contain between 100 and 
200 members, with the average Society size being 130.  All area cocoa is sold to the 
GCMB-PBD at Society offices.  Each farmer is free to join the Society of his/her choice, 
but is subject to a common membership fee:  during cocoa sales each Society 
withholds as dues 1 kg of cocoa per 64-kg bag weighed. 
Thirty-five of the forty farmers in our sample (87.5 percent) bank at the KRB.  All 
hold savings accounts. When asked why they operate these accounts, the farmers 
gave the following reasons (in order of prevalence): to facilitate the cashing of Akuafo 
Checks (94 percent); to obtain credit (80 percent); to safeguard their money (28.6 
percent). 
Twenty-nine of the thirty-five farmers in our sample who bank with the KRB, or 
83 percent, have applied at least once for a loan from the bank.  In each and every 
case, the farmer wanted KRB credit in order to finance “lean season” farm-improvement 
work (e.g., purchases of inputs such as pesticides, general maintenance and weeding 
under the trees, expansion of land under cultivation).12  Only 11 (31 percent) of these 
farmers have been granted a loan, and each only once.13  These loans ranged in 
maturity from one to seven months, with an average maturity of a little over four 
months.  Two loans were for only 10,000 cedis (half the size of the smallest reported 
loan by KRB officials), the largest was for 300,000 cedis, and the average loan amount 
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was 104,000 cedis.  When we asked the recipients if this credit was sufficient for their 
desired farm-improvement work, ten of the eleven answered “No.” 
With respect to their use of the loans, only five actually used the credit for the 
stated purpose.  The other six borrowers diverted their loans towards school fees, 
marriage, medical expenses, and the settling of other debts.  Repayment problems 
were reported by half of the borrowers.  The sources of these problems, according to 
them, could be traced to loans that (in order of importance) were 1) too small, 2) too 
short-term, and 3) carried charges that were too stiff.14 
Finally, the farmers in our sample who bank at the KRB do not believe that the 
bank is providing them with a dependable Akuafo Check cashing service.  Specifically, 
over 90 percent stated that they experienced at least some difficulty in cashing their 
Akuafo Checks at the bank, and fully two-thirds reported “much difficulty.”  Only three 
farmers, in fact, indicated that they have experienced “no difficulty” in cashing their 
Akuafo Checks. 
 
Sources of Difficulty 
As far as the cocoa farmers are concerned, the KRB does not provide them with 
the services they desire, namely dependable Akuafo Check cashing and access to 
farm-improvement loans.  With respect to the latter, two points are in order.  First, KRB 
credit is, essentially, beyond the reach of cocoa farmers.  Loan applicants, for example, 
must conduct their business on the bank's premises, during business hours.  The 
process itself is cumbersome, detailed, and requires literacy (or the help of a literate 
friend).  In addition, applicants must purchase all the necessary forms themselves.  
These non-interest transaction costs probably dominate the explicit interest charges in 
total borrowing costs.15  The KRB’s collateral requirements, moreover, make credit 
unavailable to many cocoa farmers at any price.  As a result of these factors, perhaps, 
three farmers in our sample who are currently not seeking loans from the bank are 
actually “discouraged loan-seekers”: each reported that “Others do not get approved for 
loans, so why should I even try to obtain one”?  Second, if a farmer is lucky enough to 
succeed in obtaining credit, the loan is not tailored to his/her specific farm-improvement 
needs. 
To compound the situation, the farmers do not understand why the KRB does 
not provide the desired services.  When we asked the farmers in our sample why they 
experienced difficulty in cashing Akuafo Checks, their responses ranged from “no idea” 
to “the KRB lies,” “the KRB does not care for farmers,” and KRB corruption.  Of the 17 
who commented on why the bank turned them down for loans, only three stated that it 
was for lack of collateral, whereas 14 claimed that they had “no idea.”16 
As a result, the farmers are losing confidence in the KRB.  This has manifested 
itself in several ways.  First, Akuafo Check diversion is on the rise, depriving the bank of 
the chance to capture at least some of these funds as voluntary savings.  During the 
1990/91 season, the KRB purchased 61 percent of all checks issued to KCD farmers, 
but by 1993/94 only 46.2 percent of the KCD’s Akuafo Checks were being redeemed at 
the bank.  In early 1995, moreover, the KRB officials estimated that the bank was going 
to purchase only 24 percent of the Akuafo Checks issued to farmers across its 
extended service area during the 1994/95 season.  But diversion is costly for the 
farmers: aside from the KRB, even today the nearest formal financial institutions are at 
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least a full day’s arduous and expensive journey away.  The fact that check diversion 
has been occurring on such a large scale, therefore, is indicative of how mistrustful the 
farmers are of the KRB. 
Second, when farmers are able to cash their Akuafo Checks at the KRB, they 
withdraw as much money as possible--for fear that funds will not be available later.  
This withdrawal activity, in tandem with increased Akuafo Check diversion, indicates 
that the farmers have cut back their saving with the KRB.  The bank’s savings-
mobilization efforts have, accordingly, been impaired.  Indeed, the dollar-value of 
savings deposits per person has fallen steadily throughout the 1990s.  As of March 
1994 this figure stood at only 36 percent of its 1991 peak value (and at 39 percent of 
the average savings deposit per person during 1990 and 1991). 
Third, the KRB’s default rate, according to the bank officials we interviewed, has 
begun to increase.17  Some farmers who manage to obtain credit from the KRB do not 
feel obliged to repay.  These individuals believe they are getting a government grant, or 
simply a long-overdue Akuafo Check payment.  Others, who have diverted their loans 
to non-productive uses, default because they cannot repay.  Regardless of the reason, 
defaulting is easy:  the farmer can simply divert future Akuafo Checks to another 
financial institution. 
Default-by-check-diversion has damaged the KRB's solvency and liquidity 
positions.  To some extent, therefore, the ability of the bank to honor its customers' 
deposit-withdrawal requests has been compromised.  Many of the farmers we 
interviewed, indeed, commented on the difficulty they have experienced in making 
withdrawals from their accounts. 
Finally, two-thirds of the cocoa farmers in our sample who currently bank with the 
KRB are planning to switch banks in the near future.  Three of the five members of our 
sample not now banking with the KRB, moreover, used to hold savings accounts and 
cash their Akuafo Checks at the bank but have already severed all ties.  These three 
have switched, and 23 others in our sample plan to do the same, because of difficulties 
they have experienced with respect to (in order of importance) obtaining credit and 
cashing Akuafo Checks.  One other farmer indicated that although he would like to 
switch banks he is not going to--because in his view no other financial institution is near 
enough for him to use on a regular basis.  He feels trapped. 
The KRB, however, considers itself a victim primarily of external circumstances.  
From the bank’s perspective, the Akuafo Check scheme is an exogenous factor 
impinging on the KRB’s performance.  Bank officials, for example, have tried to point 
out to the farmers that difficulties in cashing Akuafo Checks can be traced, primarily, to 
late-arriving and/or insufficient government check-redemption funds.18  Exacerbating 
this problem is the lack of funds at the bank to proceed with check purchases in the 
absence of external check-redemption money, because Akuafo Check purchases by 
the KRB mark the beginning of the seasonal inflow of deposits and thus the end of the 
bank's own “lean season.”  Deposits thus flow into the bank during the cocoa season, 
and the accumulated funds peak around December.  The farmers then begin drawing 
down their deposits for expenses: by March the bank’s deposit-level is at its annual 
average point, and from June through August there are barely enough funds in the 
bank to keep existing accounts from being closed.  The KRB's inability to cash its 
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customers' Akuafo Checks at the beginning of the cocoa season appears to be driven, 
therefore, by exogenous factors. 
With respect to loan recovery, bank officials believe that the rising default rate 
stems from (in order of importance):  poor weather, difficulty in monitoring loans, and 
Akuafo Check diversion.  The first and last of these factors are beyond the control of 
the KRB; lack of resources, inadequate staff training, and severe transport and 
communications difficulties19   render the bank unable, in general, to monitor loans 
effectively.  A sense of helplessness pervaded the officials' responses to our queries 
about the default problem. 
When asked about the bank’s future plans, officials stated that they are 
determined to improve the loan-recovery rate at all costs.  The KRB has, for example, 
resolved to take legal action against any defaulter.  In order to increase the likelihood 
that assets can be confiscated in event of nonpayment, the collateral requirement for all 
new loans is to be raised to documentary proof of farm and/or house ownership (i.e., 
the “guarantor” option is to be eliminated).  These measures, however, are difficult if not 
impossible to implement effectively, especially in the African context (Adams et al 
1984), (Besley 1994).  The fact that the bank is even considering such action, therefore, 
may reflect how desperate the bank officials perceive the situation to be. 
We conclude from the KRB and cocoa-farmer interview results that even though 
the KRB has achieved the central bank’s highest rating and is in compliance with all 
national banking legislation, significant problems--most of which are similar to those 
faced by many Rural Banks, and to those faced by the cocoa-area Rural Banks in 
particular--plague the bank.  The KRB’s ability to function as a genuine financial 
intermediary--and to provide desired financial services to the target population on a 
sustained basis--has been impaired.  Indeed, as one KRB official put it, the bank 
currently functions as a “payment center” rather than as a savings-mobilizer.  Finally, 
the KRB has not been able to educate its farmer-customers as to its purposes, 
activities, and the constraints under which it operates. 
Given the current attitudes and future plans of both the KRB and the cocoa 
farmers, we believe that the situation has the potential to deteriorate quickly.  The 
KRB’s reluctance to extend credit to farmers at the needed time and on appropriate 
terms is likely to rise, and because of late and/or insufficient deliveries of government 
funds, the KRB may continue to experience difficulty redeeming Akuafo Checks quickly.  
If so, the farmers’ confidence in the bank will continue to fall, and their mistrust will 
grow.  As a result, the average account-balance at the bank will continue to fall, more 
Akuafo Checks will be diverted every cocoa season, and the lending capability of the 
KRB will fall.  The bank will thus find it harder every season to redeem Akuafo Checks 
without timely and sufficient deliveries of external funds.  The result will be yet more 
diversion of Akuafo Checks, less savings-mobilization, a deepening liquidity problem, 
and less credit-extension to farmers, all in an atmosphere of growing mutual mistrust.  
The KRB could thus easily lose its Satisfactory rating, slip down into the Mediocre 
category, and experience a solvency/liquidity crisis. 
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IV.     A REFORM-AND-RENEWAL PROGRAM FOR THE KRB 
 
We conclude, however, that the KRB is far from doomed to such a fate.  The 
bank’s potential to meet the financial-services needs of its cocoa-farming clientele 
remains intact, despite key features of its economic environment (e.g., covariant risk, 
lack of information, imperfect contract enforcement, the Akuafo Check program, the 
rules and regulations of the Rural Bank scheme) that impinge upon its performance.  
The KRB can, we believe, enhance its outreach to the target population without 
sacrificing (and possibly moving closer to) its goal of financial self-sustainability. 
In order to move itself towards becoming a valuable and permanent fixture of the 
local economic landscape, the bank must modify its lending procedures.  The 
necessary changes are, fortunately, relatively easy to make--and feasible within the 
current structure of the Rural Bank program.  They can thus be implemented by the 
KRB directly, without any need for consultation with the central bank or any other 
government agency. 
In constructing our reform package for the KRB, we employ what we have called 
earlier the Learn From Success school of RFI reform developed in one strand of the 
Financial Systems Approach literature.  In the process, we heed Yaron’s (1994: 68-9) 
warning that “the quest for [workable policy reforms] should involve a careful review of 
the past track record of similar programs in the country involved and the targeted 
clientele’s experience and perception of the moral obligation associated with loan 
collection.”  We thus follow the advice of the World Bank (1989) by advocating only 
those measures that build upon, rather than supplant, extant and successful financial 
traditions in Ghana. 
More specifically, we incorporate into the local KRB/cocoa farmer context (with 
the necessary adaptations), the following: 
1. Current, widespread practices in Ghanaian informal finance, given that the 
informal financial sector dominates the provision of financial services to 
small borrowers/savers, and to rural households and businesses; 
2. Some of the key operating features of Nontraditional financial institutions in 
developing countries that serve small borrowers/savers and 
microenterprises successfully by combining features of formal and 
informal finance. 
 
Reform Specifics 
We believe that one key feature of the KRB's current operating environment--the 
fact that all cocoa farmers in the bank’s extended service currently belong to officially-
constituted Societies--can be exploited to establish a successful group-lending scheme.  
First, these groups are homogeneous:  all members have the same occupation, similar 
incomes, similar demands for financial services, and live in the local area.  Second, 
these Societies have been in existence for years, perform specific non-credit-related 
functions (e.g., all cocoa-purchasing by the GCMB-PBD is done through the Societies, 
at each Society's office), and finance their operations through membership dues.  
Several of the success-factors for group lending that have been identified in the 
literature are thus present.20  Furthermore, lending to individuals in a group context is a 
common practice in Ghanaian informal finance.  Many households and small 
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savers/borrowers participate in one of two variants of the Susu system of savings and 
credit: the traditional “Rotating Savings and Credit Association” (ROSCA) version, and 
the so-called “Welfare-Susu” (Gabianu 1990), (Aryeetey & Hyuha 1991), (African 
Development Bank 1997), and (Aryeetey et al 1997).  Should KRB officials decide to 
open discussions with the Societies on group lending, the cocoa farmers would find 
themselves--for possibly the first time ever, when dealing with a formal financial 
institution--on comfortable, familiar ground. 
We propose, therefore, that the KRB cease dealing with individual farmers-as-
borrowers and lend to the cocoa subsector via the Societies themselves.  Since the 
Rural Bank program requires the KRB to allocate a minimum of 50 percent of its new 
loan funds each year to local cocoa farmers, the bank could simply distribute this 
amount of money equally across the Societies  (or across a rotating subset of Societies) 
each year.  Each Society could then act as a ROSCA-Susu by allocating the available 
credit across its membership on a rotating basis and enforcing repayment.  Each 
Society would thus serve as the agent for its individual members-as-borrowers, just as it 
now serves as the agent for its members-as-sellers. 
In order to qualify for credit, each Society would be required to place its collected 
membership dues on deposit with the KRB.  The amount of credit available to the 
Society as a whole would then be made an increasing function of the Society's “Dues 
Account.”  This procedure is, in the language of early Financial Systems Approach 
analysts adhering to the Learn From Success school (Adams & Fitchett 1992), an 
application of the lesson of “discipline” from informal finance:  each Society must learn 
to save first--and thereby earn its creditworthiness--in order to qualify for access to 
credit.  Alternatively, this requirement could be interpreted as a “market interlinkage” 
that helps resolve the adverse selection problem by providing the lender with 
information about the riskiness of the borrower.21 
Individual cocoa farmers, therefore, would be eligible for KRB credit simply by 
being Society members in good standing (i.e., dues-payers).  The criteria for obtaining 
credit would thus be clear and obvious--which would go a long way towards eliminating 
the mistrust and misunderstanding that currently pervades bank-farmer relations.  But, 
would this mechanism be familiar, and acceptable, to the KRB’s cocoa-farming 
clientele”  Yes: not only do the ROSCA-Susu and Welfare-Susu systems require 
members to save first before obtaining credit, but the single most widespread informal 
financial institution in Ghana--the Single Collector Susu System--provides credit only to 
those who have accumulated prior savings with their individual Collectors (Gabianu 
1990), (Aryeetey & Hyuha 1991), (Aryeetey & Udry 1994), (African Development Bank 
1997), and (Aryeetey et al 1997).  Furthermore, the evidence indicates that rural 
Ghanaians save in substantial amounts (Nissanke 1991), and that anywhere from 60 
percent to 95 percent of their financial savings is mobilized via informal finance 
(Nissanke 1991), (Aryeetey & Hyuha 1991).  It is likely, therefore, that a clear majority 
of the KRB’s cocoa-farmer customers currently save--in order to safeguard their money 
and to obtain credit--with a local “Susuman.” 
Borrowing from successful Nontraditional financial institution practice ([e.g., 
Rhyne & Otero (1992), Berenbach & Guzman (1994), Yaron (1994), Yaron et al (1998)], 
we recommend that all loan application, processing, disbursement, and recovery 
activities be decentralized--conducted at Society offices, during the cocoa season--
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rather than on the premises of the KRB.  This reform not only reduces the non-interest 
transaction costs absorbed by individual farmer-borrowers, it also has the potential to 
enhance, immediately, the prospects for loan recovery. 
Since the Society Clerk has records on each individual member, when a 
member-borrower sells his/her cocoa to the GCMB-PBD at the office the Clerk can 
simply specify the amount of the farmer's Akuafo Check to be withheld for dues (as the 
Clerk currently does), and loan-servicing.  These funds would then be deposited into 
the Society's Dues Account at the KRB.  All loan-repayments, therefore, would be made 
directly from the Society's Dues Account--its effective “Loan Servicing Account”--via 
deductions by the KRB itself.  This procedure thus bypasses the problem of the 
farmer's ability to specify the beneficiary of the Akuafo Check:  even if the farmer diverts 
his/her Akuafo Check to another institution, the KRB receives its loan repayments. 
Borrowers, of course, can still default.  But to default in this scheme would 
require a farmer to bypass the legal cocoa-marketing channel and, in effect, withdraw 
from the GCMB-PBD Society system.  To further mitigate default risk, we recommend 
that the KRB drop its reliance on traditional physical-asset collateral (an often 
ineffective enforcement incentive anyway, as the bank’s officials themselves 
acknowledge), and instead motivate recovery by combining two indirect repayment 
incentives.  First, if a borrower defaults, s/he would lose access to future KRB credit.  
This sanction has proven effective in both informal and Nontraditional finance settings 
in many developing countries, and is the reason most often specified by informal-sector 
borrowers in Africa when asked why they repay (Rhyne & Otero 1992), (Berenbach & 
Guzman 1994), (Aryeetey & Udry 1994), and (Aryeetey 1996).  Second, if a borrower 
defaults, his/her Society as a whole would lose access to future credit.  We thus 
incorporate the principle of joint liability into our group-lending proposal: each Society 
would guarantee the individual loans made to its members, and each Society’s access 
to future credit would be a function of the Society’s ability to meet its current debt 
obligations to the KRB. 
But, as Yaron (1994), Berenbach & Guzman (1994), and Aryeetey & Udry (1994) 
point out, joint liability can motivate individual repayment only in cohesive social groups 
to which the lender provides benefits that can indeed be cut off from all members in the 
event of default.  Leaving aside until Section 5 the issue of the social cohesiveness of 
the farmer Societies, does the KRB have this sort of “leverage” over its cocoa-farmer 
customers’  Yes: our survey data indicate that alternative sources of credit for farm-
improvement purposes are not readily available to the bank’s cocoa farmers.  In the 
absence of KRB loans, 29 of the 35 KRB customers in our sample reported that their 
only source of farm-improvement credit was “own savings,” and four of the others 
stated that they obtained the necessary financing from a combination of own savings 
and loans from relatives/friends.  Only one farmer relied exclusively on loans from 
relatives/friends to fund farm-improvement activities, in the absence of KRB credit. 
These data are consistent with the finding of Nissanke (1991), Aryeetey & Udry 
(1994), and Aryeetey et al (1997) that informal finance in Africa does not, in general, 
provide the type of medium-size, medium-term financing for investment purposes that is 
desired by borrowers such as the KRB’s cocoa farmers.  We conclude, therefore, that 
cutting off the entire Society’s access to future KRB credit in the event of individual 
default will “bite.”  As a result, social sanctions imposed on a would-be defaulter by the 
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group--in the form of peer pressure to repay, in combination with the threat of expulsion 
from the group--are likely to be severe, and effective. 
 
Benefits 
Our reform-and-renewal program promises to reduce significantly the transaction 
costs faced by both the KRB and its borrowers.  The local small-scale cocoa sector 
would thus be brought within reach of the KRB as a lending institution, and KRB credit 
would be brought within reach of individual farmers.  Implementing our policy 
recommendations should therefore put the KRB back on the road to becoming a 
genuine financial intermediary that provides its cocoa-farming clientele with the financial 
services it demands, on a sustained basis. 
The benefits to the KRB include significant reductions in loan-administration 
costs and default risk.  The bank would no longer need to expend resources screening 
potential borrowers, for the Societies themselves would perform this function.  Each 
group, moreover, would be in a better position than the KRB to determine its individual 
members' creditworthiness--because of detailed knowledge of cocoa farming, and 
specific knowledge of members' economic and financial circumstances.  The task of 
loan-monitoring, likewise, would be left to the cocoa farmers themselves.  Given the 
joint liability feature of our group-lending scheme, the bank could rely on the incentive 
members would have to engage in peer-monitoring.22  Finally, enforcement costs and 
problems would be minimized.  The indirect repayment incentive mechanisms built into 
our proposal put the burden of loan recovery upon the Societies themselves, insure that 
defaulters will lose valuable benefits that only the KRB can provide, and harness the 
forces of peer pressure and social sanction to motivate repayment. 
In sum, our group-lending proposal should mitigate the problems of imperfect 
information and imperfect contract enforcement that have given rise to the KRB’s 
reluctance to lend to local cocoa farmers.  By employing what Yaron (1994: 68) refers 
to as a “social mechanism that lowers transaction costs while supplying effective peer 
pressure for screening loan applicants and collecting loans,” not only should the KRB’s 
outreach to its target population be enhanced, but its financial position strengthened as 
well. 
From the perspective of an individual cocoa farmer, KRB credit would be more 
accessible, and more convenient to obtain.23  For example, the loan-application process 
would take place at the Society's office (a regular place of business for members) 
between Society members, and hence with a minimum of formality.  In addition, 
prospective borrowers would no longer be required to provide what they often cannot 
(i.e., traditional collateral--due to poorly-defined property rights, and detailed business 
records--due to illiteracy), in order to be eligible for credit. 
Borrowers, moreover, would likely obtain access to more appropriate credit 
facilities, for at least three reasons.  First, because all loan transactions would be 
conducted at Society offices during the cocoa-selling season, the cocoa farmers would 
be able to obtain credit when they demand it.24  Second, each Society would be free to 
allocate its total amount of credit across members so as to guarantee that each 
recipient obtains an amount sufficient to fund his/her farm-improvement needs.  Third, 
Societies would have an incentive, and the ability, to permit longer-term borrowing by 
individuals (desired by all the farmers in our sample)--even if the KRB maintains its 
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short-term maturity policy.  The possibility of access to a longer-term loan in the future 
could be incentive enough for current non-borrowers in a Society to tax themselves 
willingly (to service the debts of fellow members), so that Societal repayment 
performance can be maintained, and access to future credit assured, even as some 
members make long-term use of credit.25 
Because farmers would understand clearly the criteria for obtaining credit, and 
would begin to obtain the specific financial services from the KRB that they demand, it 
is likely that less Akuafo Check diversion would take place over time.  More cocoa 
money would thus be transformed into voluntary savings, and the total amount of credit 
available for cocoa farmers would therefore begin to expand.  The farmers’ incentive to 
save at the KRB would thus rise further, and a “virtuous circle” could begin to operate:  
more saving would beget more credit, less diversion of Akuafo Checks, and thus even 
more saving and more credit year-by-year.  The area’s cocoa farmers would finally be 
given the “golden opportunity to demonstrate their business acumen” that the KRB is 
supposed to provide, and the bank would be on its way to becoming a viable, 
dependable source of desired financial services for the local population. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The potential for this reform-and-renewal program to succeed in the rural 
Ghanaian context, we believe, is great.  First, it can be implemented by the KRB within 
the current operating framework of the Rural Bank scheme.  The central bank’s 1985 
Operational Manual for Rural Banks makes explicit allowance for group lending under 
conditions of joint liability.  The Manual, in fact, provides specific guidelines for each 
bank to follow, should it desire to pursue this practice.  Second, students of RFMs 
within Ghana have advocated group lending repeatedly.  Owusu-Acheampong (1986), 
in his study of rural finance in Ghana, was optimistic about the potential for this practice 
to be a success.  More recently, Essel (1996: 36) notes that group-lending schemes 
have been “gradually gaining ground among the Rural Banks,” and that the benefits 
reaped by the banks and their customers to date have been significant.  He concludes 
his careful analysis of the Rural Bank program by arguing that the banks should 
“intensify efforts” to establish group-based lending programs.   
 Finally, we have observed that our Learn From Success approach has already 
been employed in Ghana, with, in some cases, excellent results.  For example, the 
State Insurance Corporation launched a savings-and-credit scheme known as the 
“Money Back” program in February 1987, which was patterned directly after the Single 
Collector Susu System.  The initial response was encouraging, and by the end of the 
decade Gabianu (1990) could report that there were, in general, “no problems” with the 
scheme in practice.  In the late 1980s the privately-run Bamask Company also 
employed the techniques of the Single Collector Susu System to reach small savers-
cum-borrowers in Ghana.  The program proved hugely popular: within its first three 
years of operation Bamask had established branches in nine of the ten regions in 
Ghana, and by the end of the 1980s more than 30 companies offering a similar service 
had been established (Gabianu 1990).  With respect to group lending by formal 
financial institutions, the Agricultural Development Bank itself has begun to employ this 
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practice in its dealings with farmers, along lines similar to those we advocate for the 
KRB. 
 The central question, however, that must be tackled when analyzing the 
prospects for our reform-and-renewal program is this: To what extent will the cocoa-
farmer Societies function effectively, within the framework of this group-lending 
scheme?  To make this program successful, each Society must be able to manage its 
credit, meet the needs of its individual members, conduct loan transactions 
competently, and motivate recovery effectively.  The Societies are thus partners with 
the KRB in this program, with commitments to fulfill.  Will they be able to do so? 
For any group lending program to succeed, the groups must be kept small enough to 
enable cohesiveness to develop over time, permit the free flow of information among 
members, and minimize free-rider problems (Berenbach & Guzman 1994), (Yaron 
1994), (Mutua 1994), and (Aryeetey 1996).  The well-known and well-chronicled 
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, for example, operates with groups of five.  The farmer-
groups that Thailand’s Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives has been 
lending to successfully since 1966 contain no more than 30 members.  Kenya’s Juhudi 
Credit Scheme, in operation since 1991, also limits its groups to 30.  The regulations 
governing group lending by Ghana’s Rural Banks, indeed, specify that the groups can 
contain no more than 20 members each. 
 How a group is formed is also crucial to the success of a program.  A hallmark of 
successful programs in developing countries has been group self-formation.  Groups 
that can choose their own leaders, and have the authority to reject applicants for 
membership (and expel members who fail to live up to their responsibilities) have the 
best chance of being able to fulfill the functions required of them (Berenbach & Guzman 
1994). Aryeetey & Udry (1994), likewise, emphasize the importance of “pre-screening” 
by groups; in their review of informal finance in Africa they find that when a group 
considers a potential new member the key question it asks is not “Can s/he repay?” but 
rather “Can this person be trusted to meet his/her obligations to the group?”  
 Allowing individuals to decide for themselves which group to join, on the other 
hand, can cause a group-based lending program to fail.  For example, self-selection 
can reduce the homogeneity--and hence the social cohesiveness--of the group.  In 
addition, since participants are free to join the group of their choice, each individual 
group cannot effectively sanction a member in default.  S/he can simply drop out, and 
join another group. 
 The ability of a group to meet its responsibilities in a joint-liability lending scheme 
thus depends on its size, homogeneity, the commitment of individual members to the 
group’s goals, and the extent to which reciprocal obligations are morally binding.  
Groups that are small, homogeneous, and with a committed pre-screened membership 
are likely to possess (or develop over time) what Besley & Coate (1995) call “social 
collateral”--which will enable them to manage their credit-related responsibilities well.  
Groups without the necessary social collateral will in all likelihood prove unable to 
function effectively.   
 In setting up a group lending scheme, therefore, one lesson that can be drawn is 
“do not rush.”  Putting together such a program on a short-term timetable, with short-
term performance objectives in mind, is a recipe for failure: the hurriedly-constituted 
groups will lack the needed social collateral.  The difficulties experienced by the Juhudi 
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Scheme in Kenya during its start-up phase, for example, resulted from too-rapid group 
formation in combination with self-selection (Mutua 1994).  Aryeetey (1996), in his 
discussion of donor-financed “innovative credit-retailing schemes” in Africa, notes that 
rapid expansion of group-lending programs can undermine the forces of peer pressure 
and social stigma--and hence lead to poor performance. 
 In light of this analysis, how do the KRB’s cocoa-farmer Societies measure up?  
First, we address two negatives.  The Societies are, of course, too large to function 
effectively.  But they could easily be broken down into the necessary 20-person sub-
units.  To do this, the KRB could adapt the procedure followed by the now increasingly 
successful Juhudi Scheme--which embeds smaller sub-units within larger “umbrella” 
groups.  Another problem with the current Society system is that cocoa farmers are free 
to join the Society of their choice; self-selection is the rule.  But this can be changed, 
too.  The KRB can simply mandate that any Society wishing to receive KRB credit must 
have the authority to pre-screen members and expel defaulters.  Cocoa farmers not 
willing to accept this requirement would become ineligible for KRB credit. 
 On the positive side, the Societies are socioculturally and economically 
homogeneous.  They have been in existence for years, have an operational 
infrastructure, and perform specific non-credit-related functions.  Furthermore, group-
based savings and credit activities are an established feature of Ghanaian informal 
finance; our proposal does not constitute an alien intrusion from another, qualitatively 
different socioeconomic environment.  Finally, in our proposed scheme individual 
farmers will obtain access to specific financial services that they expressly demand, but 
which are not otherwise obtainable.  The members of each Society will thus have a 
strong incentive to develop the social collateral needed for them to manage effectively 
their collective responsibilities.  
 But our reform-and-renewal program does not represent a “quick fix” for the 
KRB’s problems.  Both the KRB and the farmers will have to be patient, and learn 
together how to make it work.  As Besley (1994) notes, it takes time in any setting for 
the participants to acquire the “human and organizational capital” necessary for 
financial markets to operate effectively.  
 Regardless, we see no clear alternative route for the KRB to take.  Should it 
pursue “business as usual” the bank runs the risk of falling into a solvency/liquidity 
crisis, as described in Section 3.  Its outreach to cocoa farmers would erode, and its 
financial self-sustainability would be threatened.  Should it pursue retrenchment by 
raising traditional collateral requirements on loans, taking defaulters to court, limiting its 
exposure to the cocoa sector, and in general operating more like a Ghanaian 
commercial bank, the KRB will not be able to fulfill its statutory goals.  As Rhyne & 
Otero (1992: 1569) bluntly state:  “No bank will succeed with [small borrowers] by 
applying its standard operating procedures.” 
 In conclusion, we note that the KRB is currently in much better financial shape 
than the average Rural Bank.  A solvency/liquidity crisis, requiring short-term 
emergency measures and genuine retrenchment, does not prevail.  Right now, then, is 
a good time for the KRB to consider our reform proposal, and give it a try.  What could 
the KRB lose by doing so?  Not very much.  What could the bank lose by not doing so?  
Potentially, a great deal indeed. 
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NOTES 
1. See, for example, Adams (1978), Adams & Nehman (1979), Adams & Graham 
(1981), and Adams et al (1984). 
2. For a more complete statement of the theory of Financial Liberalization, see Pill 
& Pradhan (1997).  Nissanke (1991), the African Development Bank (1994), and 
Aryeetey et al (1997) discuss Financial Liberalization efforts in Africa during the 
1980s and 1990s. 
3. For a general introduction to this approach, see Braverman & Guasch (1986), 
Hoff & Stiglitz (1990), Srinivasan (1994), and Besley (1994).  Good examples of 
the Africa-specific literature in this tradition are Udry (1990) and Aryeetey & Udry 
(1994). 
4. Early statements of this view in the African context can be found in Nissanke 
(1991) and the African Development Bank (1994).  The policy views of African 
adherents to the Linkage school are developed more fully in Aryeetey (1996), the 
African Development Bank (1997), and Aryeetey et al (1997). 
5. The first statements of this position grew out of the aforementioned Ohio State 
School critiques of Directed Credit, and can be found, e.g., in Adams & Vogel 
(1986), Padmanabhan (1988), the World Bank (1989), and Adams & Fitchett 
(1992).  Other contributors to this school of thought, who often focus on the 
effective delivery of credit to microenterprises, are Rhyne & Otero (1992), the 
contributors to Otero & Rhyne (1994), Riedinger (1994), Yaron (1994), and 
Yaron et al (1998). 
6. This point is emphasized in Adams & Fitchett (1992), Rhyne & Otero (1992), and 
Riedinger (1994). 
7. In April 1983 the government agreed to an International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)/World Bank-sponsored ERP, in the context of a near-total breakdown of 
the Ghanaian economy.  The ERP was a comprehensive economic reform 
program concerned with short-term stabilization issues, medium-to-long term 
structural adjustment, and the rehabilitation of the productive sectors of the 
economy.  It remained in force, although its foci shifted as necessary over time, 
throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s.  See, e.g., Younger (1989), and Kapur, 
Hadjimichael, Hilbers, Schiff, & Szymczak (1991) for analyses of the ERP. 
8. In the past, at times the GCMB-PBD paid farmers with cash delivered from the 
capital city, but that often led to embezzlement and extortion by PBD clerks.  At 
other times the farmers received “chits” for their cocoa, redeemable by the 
government at some unspecified future date. 
9. The cedi, however, depreciated nearly 530 percent against the dollar during 
1987-94, so in dollar terms deposits per person fell roughly 10 percent. 
10. Perhaps this is because literacy is required to operate a current account (i.e., to 
endorse a check). 
11. Ever since the late 1950s (when the land in this area was first developed for 
cocoa farming), land transactions have been conducted orally, with the chief, at 
Adabokrom.  These transactions are informal rental agreements, not land 
purchases, and are generally sealed with gifts of Schnapps or the local gin.  The 
rents are generally left unspecified. 
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12. Cocoa farming in Ghana has two seasons: an active growing and harvesting 
season--the “cocoa season”--which runs roughly from late September to early 
February, and the off-season or “lean season,” from March through early 
September. 
13. Eight of them received their loans during 1992/93, and the other three were 
given loans in previous years. 
14. We do not believe that this last source of repayment difficulty can be separated 
from the previous two: loans that are too small and short-term for the stated 
purpose may by definition carry terms that are too stiff--regardless of the interest 
charges. 
15. This has been shown to be true in most institutional rural credit programs in 
LDCs.  See, for example, Adams & Nehman (1979), Adams & Graham (1981), 
Adams & Vogel (1986), Rhyne & Otero (1992), and Adams & Fitchett (1992). 
16. Into this category we place various other responses that indicate a lack of 
understanding of the process, e.g., “the KRB is always unresponsive to farmers,” 
“the KRB lies to farmers,” “the KRB never grants loans to farmers.” 
17. We could not find specific default rate information in the KRB’s Annual Reports, 
nor could (or would) any bank official provide us with that information. 
18. Newspaper reports from cocoa areas all over the country during the early 1990s 
indicated that many Rural Banks and other financial institutions face this 
problem.  Hence we take statements of the KRB officials on this issue at face 
value. 
19. As of mid-1994, no telephone connections existed between branch offices, and 
only one office had a working telephone system.  Inter-agency communications 
and loan-monitoring take place via the KRB’s lone vehicle, which must ply the 
few poorly-maintained roads in this area as best it can. 
20. Reviews of group-lending practices in LDCs can be found in Padmanabhan 
(1988), the World Bank (1989), Rhyne & Otero (1992), Riedinger (1994), and 
Berenbach & Guzman (1994).  Srinivasan (1994) also contains a summary of 
theoretical work on group lending.  In Yaron’s (1994) review of successful 
Nontraditional rural finance schemes in Asia, two of the programs he studies 
involve group lending.  Aryeetey (1996) and the African Development Bank 
(1997) discuss group-lending practice in the African context; Mutua (1994) 
focuses on the Juhudi Scheme operated by the Kenya Rural Enterprise 
Program--KREP. 
21. As Adams et al (1984: 44, 252) has put it: “Deposits generate important 
information for credit institutions when loan customers maintain accounts with 
the lender.  Deposits can thus provide for continuous insight into the financial 
situation of borrowers.... [and] help to refine estimates of their creditworthiness.” 
22. Aryeetey & Udry (1994) and Aryeetey (1996) note, however, that most informal 
lenders in Africa, and in Ghana, do not monitor loans.  Whether the KRB cocoa 
farmers monitor or not, the decision would be up to them in our scheme. 
23. The literature [e.g., Adams & Graham (1981), Rhyne & Otero (1992), Berenbach 
& Guzman (1994)] consistently finds that the primary concern of small borrowers 
is not interest cost, but rather availability and convenience of credit. 
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24. As noted throughout the Financial Systems Approach literature [e.g., 
Padmanabhan (1988)], “credit delayed is credit denied.” 
25. Such a “reciprocal” credit obligation (Adams & Fitchett 1992) could well develop 
in this context, for reciprocity is a common feature of Ghanaian informal finance.  
For example, in the Welfare-Susu system, the pooled savings of members are 
not distributed regularly, but rather kept on deposit as credit-reserves for 
members who have maintained their contributions (Gabianu 1990).  
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